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Modelling and appraising liquidity in ﬁnancial markets has been of paramount importance for cen-
tral banks, regulators and practitioners for the last decade. The perceived liquidity decrease during
the ﬁnancial crisis of 1998 has led many to question the functioning of stock markets during stress
periods. Moreover, the well-publicized problems of large hedge funds such as LTCM have also
pointed out that liquidity could dry out rapidly during crisis periods, hence normal market condi-
tions do not offer much information regarding what happens during volatile periods. As pointed
out in the empirical and theoretical literature, liquidity depends crucially on the market structure.
In price-driven markets (e.g. at the NASDAQ or in bond and FOREX markets), a market maker
ensures the continuity and viability of the trading process by quoting ﬁrm bid and ask prices what-
ever the market conditions. Thus, the inside spread (i.e. the difference between the best buy and
sell prices) and depth at the best quotes seem to be good measures of the available liquidity, that is
on an ex-ante basis. Ex-post, the liquidity of an exchange is often assessed by computing measures
such as the effective or realized spread, or VWAP (volume-weighted average price) measures. Note
that measures related to the liquidity displayed by the order book refer to pre-trade liquidity, and
will correspondingly be referred to as ex-ante liquidity measures. Examples of such measures are
the quoted spread and bid/ask depths. Measures computed with transaction data refer to realized
trading costs, thus called ex-post liquidity measures. Effective spread is a well-known example of
an ex-post liquidity measure.
In pure order-driven markets, no market maker stands ready to trade. Liquidity is thus provided
by limit orders entered throughout the day by ‘patient’ or liquidity supplier investors (often value
investors), and orders are executed only when prices match, i.e when liquidity is demanded by
‘impatient’ or liquidity demander investors. Examples of impatient traders include traders who
wish to transact near the close of the trading session (so that the price of their trade is not far from
the ofﬁcial closing price), see Cushing and Madhavan (2000), or momentum traders who are keen
on entering immediate long or short positions (Keim and Madhavan, 1997). Therefore, the inside
spread is not as relevant as in price-driven markets and depth outside the quotes (i.e. the complete
state of the order book) and times between order entry and execution (the immediacy component)
become crucial. As shown in Handa and Schwartz (1996), and discussed below, there exists a
dynamical equilibrium between limit order and market order trading which strongly determines the
available liquidity of the order book.
1While in a price-driven market the market makers ensure the continuity of the price process (for
example specialists at the NYSE are required by the exchange to maintain an ‘orderly market’), in
order-driven markets no investors have to provide liquidity. Thus it is not inconceivable that order
book systems could break down in times of stress because the dynamical equilibrium of Handa and
Schwartz (1996) between limit orders and market orders is disrupted. Which trading platform best
performs in such time periods? Some argue that the main advantage of price-driven platforms is the
presence of market makers who always have to deal, even during highly disturbed periods. On the
contrary, as no market participant has to submit limit orders in order-book markets, it is likely that,
during periods of stress, fewer limit orders are entered into the book. This then decreases liquidity.1
On the other hand, it could be argued that the heterogeneity of liquidity providers in order-driven
markets is indeed a strong advantage as it leaves room for ‘contrarian’ traders to submit orders.
These traders, unlike market makers, are not constrained by inventory holding issues and they may
have a long-term vision that incites them to enter positions which go against the current market trend
(for an example of such behaviour in the FOREX market see the report “Structural aspects of market
liquidity from a ﬁnancial stability perspective” by the Committee on the Global Financial System,
2001). Indeed, the presence of enough contrarian traders could lead to increased order-book market
liquidity than in a (pure) specialist market trading system during periods of stress.2
Finally, a key issue for central banks and regulators is how the market maker system and com-
puterized order book system behave in periods of stress.3 As argued in Mishkin and White (2002),
stock markets are inﬂuenced by monetary policy but are mainly driven by fundamentals or animal
spirits. Central banks have therefore few instruments at hand to inﬂuence the way markets behave.
For central banks and regulators the key issue is then to understand the liquidity dynamics in order
to develop prudential rules (for instance by imposing a market structure) that prevent and anticipate
the buildup of liquidity crises and price disruptions.
In this paper we analyze how liquidity is affected by increases in volatility for some stocks
traded on the Euronext trading platform during the time period that ranges from December 2, 2002
to April 30, 2003. A period with a high level of volatility will be referred to as a “stress period”,
1Another concern is the ability of order books to provide liquidity for large orders without big price discrepancies
(hence the recurrent use of upstairs or block markets for large trades in order book markets). This is not the focus of the
current study.
2In case of extreme volatility events, such as on September 11th, 2001, few contrarians would be ready to act as a
counterparts. Thus it is likely that liquidity dries out in the book whereas the specialist has to ensure the continuity of
the trading process.
3See Borio (2000) and the report “The implications of electronic trading in ﬁnancial markets” by the Committee on
the Global Financial System (2001).
2while low-volatility periods are referred as “normal periods”. Note that, contrary to most papers
dealing with high volatility periods, we do not focus on one (or succession of) extreme event(s). For
some days during that time frame, volatility was unusually large as market participants anticipated
the start of the second Gulf war and markets were quite jittery till the end of the conﬂict. The last
month of 2002 and the ﬁrst months of 2003 (i.e. just before the start of the war) were truly horrible
months for stock investors as most stock indexes (and especially European stock markets) were in a
free fall. The end of the conﬂict in Irak led to a complete turnaround for stock markets as investors
rushed to buy (then deemed oversold) equities. Using high-frequency trade and order book data,
we analyze the liquidity and volatility exhibited by some large- and mid-cap Brussels traded stocks
on the Euronext platform. We study more particularly the ex-ante liquidity vs volatility and ex-post
liquidity (effective spread for example) vs volatility relationships to ascertain if the high volatility
led to decreases in liquidity and large trading costs. From an econometric point of view, the low
and high-volatility regime states will be determined according to an endogenous classiﬁcation rule
based on Markov switching models. Besides the ex-ante and ex-post assessment of liquidity, we
also estimate VAR models for some of the variables measured on an intraday basis. Thereafter, we
assess the impulse response functions derived from these estimated VAR models and analyze the
dynamics of liquidity. Because we choose large- and mid-cap stocks for which there are no market
makers, we thus shed light on the ex-ante and ex-post liquidity vs volatility relationships in a pure
automated auction market.
The results indicate that, while ex-ante or ex-post trading costs somewhat increased with volatil-
ity, liquidity remained high (trading costs were ‘reasonable’) and the trading process did not break
down. The dynamical analysis based on the VAR model presented in the second part of the paper
offers a balanced view according to which the volatility regime bears moderately on the dynamics
of the liquidity provision. As such and anticipating on the conclusion of the paper, our results seem
to indicate that there is no real important deterioration in the provision of liquidity when volatility
increases, although we do ﬁnd that it is more costly to trade when volatility is high and that the
market dynamics is somewhat affected.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, we present a review of
the literature in Section II. The Euronext trading system and the dataset are discussed in Section
III. The ﬁrst part of the empirical analysis is presented in Section IV, while the trading dynamics is
given in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes.
3II. Review of the literature
A. Automated auction markets, liquidity and volatility
The literature on market microstructure has traditionally focused on dealership markets. Indeed,
most of the models surveyed in O’Hara (1995) focus on the behavior of market makers or deal with
ﬁxed costs, inventory costs or asymmetric information costs models in the framework of market
maker based trading systems. Because of the growing popularity of automated auction systems in
European countries or in the electronic trading systems in the United States, there is now a rapidly
evolving literature on order book markets.4 Most of the empirical studies in that ﬁeld focus on the
provision of liquidity in automated auction markets. Indeed, as no market makers stand ready to
buy and sell the traded assets in this setting, the viability of pure electronic order book markets and
the ability to trade at all times are far from ascertained. Crucially, the provision of liquidity in times
of crisis is of paramount importance. We thereafter survey some of the recent empirical work that
focuses on the provision of liquidity in order book markets, the relationship between volatility and
liquidity and the characteristics of automated auction markets in times of crisis.
In an important extension of pure dealership markets, automated auction markets allow a rela-
tively easy ex-ante characterization of liquidity beyond the inside bid-ask spread. Because the state
of the order book is usually fully or partially made available to market participants, price impact
curves (i.e. unit bid and ask prices for a given volume, also called costs of buy and sell trades
by Irvine, Benston, and Kandel, 2000) can be computed which allow the computation of extended
liquidity measures such as the cost of buy or sell trades. These measures, popularized in Irvine,
Benston, and Kandel (2000), Martinez, Tapia, and Rubio (2000), Coppejans, Domowitz, and Mad-
havan (2002) or Beltran, Giot, and Grammig (2003), aggregate the status of the order book at any
given time and offer a relatively accurate picture of the available ex-ante liquidity, i.e. before the
submission of a buy or sell trade.5
Inanowseminalpaper, Biais, Hillion, andSpatt(1995)provideoneoftheﬁrstempiricalanalysis
of a limit order book market (the Paris Bourse). They study the joint dynamics of the order ﬂow
(placement of market or limit orders) and the order book: investors place limit (market) orders
4See the book by Harris (2002).
5In dealership markets, the ex-ante available liquidity often reduces to the best bid and ask prices (or quoted spread),
and the available depth at these prices. Effective spreads or realized spreads are ex-post liquidity measures as they are
computed after the submission of the buy or sell trade.
4when the bid-ask spread is large (small) or the order book is thin (thick). Therefore, “investors
provide liquidity when it is valuable to the marketplace and consume liquidity when it is plentiful”.
They also show that there is a strong competition among traders (who monitor the state of the
order book) to provide liquidity as the ﬂow of order placements is concentrated at or inside the
bid-ask quote and the corresponding limit orders are placed in quick succession. For stocks traded
on the pure electronic limit order platform of the Hong Kong stock exchange, Ahn, Bae, and Chan
(2001) investigate the ‘ecological’ nature of the pure order driven market such as put forward in
Handa and Schwartz (1996). They show that there exists a dynamical equilibrium between limit
order trading and transitory (or short-term) volatility: market depth rises subsequent to increases
in transitory volatility and transitory volatility declines subsequent to increases in market depth.
Indeed transitory volatility attracts the placement of limit orders (instead of market orders) which
therefore add liquidity to the order book. They also show the need to separate volatility at the ask
and bid sides of the order book: when transitory volatility arises from the ask (bid) side, investors
submit more limit sell (buy) orders than market sell (buy) orders. On a related topic and for NYSE
stocks, Bae, Jang, and Park (2003) show that it is important to distinguish between transitory and
informational volatility: “a rise in transitory volatility induces a new placement of limit orders.
A rise in informational volatility appear neither to increase nor decrease the placement of limit
orders relative to market orders”. Using a Probit model applied to Swiss stocks traded on the Swiss
Stock Exchange, Ranaldo (2004) presents quite similar results: orders are more aggressive (i.e.
traders submit more marketable limit orders than just plain limit orders) when the order queue on
the incoming trader’s side of the book is larger. For example, buyers then face a smaller execution
probability and have to raise their order aggressiveness. The opposite is true for sellers. Moreover,
temporary volatility and larger spreads imply weaker trading aggressiveness. Note however that
these studies do not focus on times of crises and it is thus not clear whether they would get similar
results when trading is hectic.
Danielsson and Payne (2001) study the dynamics of liquidity supply and demand in the Reuters
D2000-2 order book trading system.6 They focus on the interaction between market and limit or-
ders and show that the probability of a limit buy (sell) order is relatively low after a market sell
(buy). Therefore, there could be strong ﬂuctuations in the provision of liquidity because of the com-
plex interplay between market and limit orders (what they call dynamic illiquidity). In agreement
with Foucault (1999), they show that the fraction of limit orders in total order arrivals increases
6The Reuters D2000-2 system is an electronic order book system designed for inter-dealer FOREX trades.
5with volatility (which increases liquidity), although the bid-ask spread also increases with volatility
(which decreases liquidity). Hence, increases in volatility yield wider bid-ask spreads and lead to
the increased placement of limit order relatively far from the quote mid-point. They also show that
market participants react strongly to the unanticipated component of volume (predictable volume
increases liquidity, unpredictable decreases liquidity). This hints at the importance of asymmetric
information in automated auction markets and suggests the need for extensions of the models by
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987).
Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000) focus on the liquidity provision at the New York Stock Exchange
during extreme market crises. Indeed, they deal with the very short time period that surrounds
October 27, 1997. On that day, the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost 554 points (which triggered
the circuit breakers) and on October 28, 1997 the index shot up by 337 points. They examine the
liquidity supplied by the limit orders (routed by the SuperDOT order book trading system) and by
the NYSE market participants (specialists and ﬂoor brokers). They show that a substantial liquidity
drain occurred on the day after the market crash (i.e. on October 28, 1997) as the order book
exhibited continuous large spreads and poor depth. However, the overall market liquidity did not
drop dramatically as the specialists and ﬂoor brokers fulﬁlled their functions of liquidity providers
and thus ensured good overall depth and low spreads at the NYSE. This hints at the adequacy of
hybrid7 market structures and shows that the viability of pure automated auction markets in times
of crisis can be threatened by the signiﬁcant drop in liquidity (due to the substantial fall in the
number of limit orders entered in the trading system). Note that Venkatamaran (2001) also stresses
the merits of hybrid trading structures which lead to reduced trading costs. This literature is also
closely connected to the literature on block trading. For example, Bessembinder and Venkatamaran
(2001) show that the upstairs (block trading) market at the Paris Bourse provides a key role in
facilitating large trades. The dealership type block trading structure thus provides considerable
additional liquidity beyond the liquidity supplied by the pure limit orders entered in the order book.
The study by Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam (2002) focuses on the commonality in liq-
uidity for stocks and bonds markets.8 Not surprisingly, they show that the correlation between stock
and bond market liquidity (proxied by OLS innovations in their linear regressions of daily liquidity
measures) sharply increases during periods of crises. This indicates greater simultaneous bond and
7A hybrid trading structure combines features of order book markets (the existence of a centralized order book run
by a computer system) and of dealership markets (the existence of market makers or ﬂoor brokers). A good example of
such a structure is the NYSE, see for example Bauwens and Giot (2001) or Soﬁanos and Werner (2000).
8Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001a) and Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001b) focus on the common-
ality in liquidity for a large set of stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange.
6stock investor uncertainty during periods of crises and shows that the loss of liquidity in times of
crisis is systemic in nature. Note that liquidity commonality (either across stocks traded at the same
venue, or across both stocks and bonds in a given country or in a set of countries) poses a problem
to diversiﬁcation strategies as ‘standard’ mean-variance analysis does not take into account liquidity
commonality when efﬁcient frontiers are computed. Domowitz and Wang (2002), as an extension of
Amihud and Mendelson (1986), focus on this issue and show that liquidity commonality is strongly
shaped by order (market vs limit orders) types. Finally, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002)
focus on order imbalances (buy orders less sell orders) and show that, for aggregated intraday NYSE
data at the daily level, order imbalances decrease market liquidity.
Most empirical studies thus conclude that the ‘ecological’ nature of the pure order driven market
works quite well: traders enter limit orders when liquidity is needed and are more impatient when
liquidity is plentiful. Automated auction markets are also quite cheap to run, and bid-ask spreads
for small to medium trades are quite low (see also Degryse, 1999). It is however not clear whether
these results hold in all circumstances. Indeed, almost all studies on automated auction markets
focus on the provision of liquidity in normal periods, i.e. not in times of crisis. In that latter case,
liquidity could rapidly deteriorate if the sole provision of liquidity comes from limit orders (i.e. in
the absence of hybrid systems that allow some provision of liquidity by market makers). Note also
that the literature on the placement of limit orders and market volatility works with the hypothe-
sis of ‘normal’/transitory market volatility. In periods of crisis where market volatility increases
signiﬁcantly and stays at high levels for many days or weeks, the ‘volatility attracts limit orders’
relationship should perhaps be qualiﬁed. These are however working hypotheses that deserve to be
investigated.
B. The regulator’s point of view
During the nineties, the growing concern in monetary economics has been the opportunity for mon-
etary authorities to react to stock market crashes and ﬁnancial distress. The key question is whether
Central Banks should have a prudential role in targeting ﬁnancial stability. This is clearly rele-
vant as history is plentiful of periods where ﬁnancial instability involved macroeconomic instability.
According to this paradigm, a ﬁnancial crisis, because it acts for instance on the solvability of ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries, could affect the activity of ﬁrms through credit rationing, also called the credit
7crunch.9 See Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Bernanke and Gertler (1999). A key underpinning of
this rationale is that price and ﬁnancial stability are symbiotic in order to maintain a sustainable non
inﬂationary growth. Solow argued that Central Banks should aim for ﬁnancial stability as a larger
risky asset volatility increases the probability of failure for ﬁnancial institutions. If the Central Bank
does not include the ﬁnancial stability criterium as a monetary policy target, an increasing number
of failures is to be expected which would be costly for the economy.10 In the same vein and because
the potential vulnerability of ﬁnancial systems increases the probability of huge and costly crises
(Borio, 2003), Borio and Lowe (2002) call for the inclusion of a ﬁnancial target along the usual
macroeconomic targets. Of course, this issue is controversial because it implies an ability to deter-
mine an equilibrium level for ﬁnancial prices (Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky, and Wadhwani, 2000 and
Borio and Lowe, 2002) discuss this problem). Note also that theoretical models and discussions of
this problem (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999 and Borio and Lowe, 2002) yield ambiguous results and
raise the issue of the choice of the ﬁnancial asset whose price must be monitored.
Recently, Mishkin and White (2002) analyze ﬁfteen historical episodes of stock market crashes
in the US and examine the aftermath of these crises. Interestingly, their study suggests that stock
market crashes by themselves do not involve ﬁnancial instability. They show that the state of the
ﬁnancial system and the nature of stress in ﬁnancial markets seem to be important. In particular,
rapidly falling stock prices in conjunction with decreasing liquidity may be particularly destabiliz-
ing.11 Therefore, as a ﬁrst step towards a prudential role of monetary authorities, a comprehensive
understanding of the dynamics of liquidity during stress periods is warranted. Moreover, a closer
look at the relationship between liquidity and volatility in times of crisis sheds light on key issues
relevant to Central Banks and regulators in the future.
9An example is the constraint in the real activity in Japan from 1992 onwards.
10See Bernanke and Gertler (1999), Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky, and Wadhwani (2000) or Durr´ e (2003) for a discus-
sion.
11Mishkin and White (2002) point out for instance that the responses of the Federal Reserve during the stock market
declines in 1929 and 1987 were more appropriate than during the recent decline which began in 2000.
8III. The Euronext platform and the dataset
A. Trading on the Euronext platform
Euronext encompasses ﬁve exchanges, namely the Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon, Paris exchanges
and the LIFFE. Euronext aims to put forward a unique electronic trading platform for all ﬁnancial
assets. This is already the case for equities trading, as the same trading platform is now used by
all exchanges. Trading on the Euronext platform takes place from 9 to 5.25 p.m CET. Limit or-
ders are matched according to the standard price and time priority rules. Market orders (also called
marketable limit orders) are executed against the best (in terms of price) prevailing order on the
opposite side of the book. If there is not enough volume to fully execute the incoming order, the
remaining part of the order is transformed into a limit order at the best price. Traders can also use
more sophisticated orders, e.g. ﬁll-or-kill orders (the limit order is either fully executed or can-
celled), must-be-ﬁlled orders (the market order is completely executed, whatever the price), iceberg
orders (part of the volume is not displayed in the book),...Block trading is allowed for large volume
trades (the size of these trades is larger than the stock speciﬁc minimum block size, called “Taille
normale de bloc”). Although the block trade formally takes place outside the book (akin to the up-
stairs market at the NYSE), the transaction price is actually constrained by the available liquidity in
the book. Indeed, Euronext displays throughout the day the hypothetical prices for a sell and a buy
order with a volume equal to the minimum block volume. No blocks can be traded at a price outside
these limits. Besides block trades, Euronext also allows so-called iceberg (or hidden) orders. As the
name suggests, a hidden limit order is not (fully) visible in the order book. This implies that if a
market order is executed against a hidden order, the trader submitting the market order may receive
an unexpected price improvement. As on other automated auction exchanges (XETRA, Toronto
stock exchange,...), iceberg orders have been allowed to heed the request of investors who were
reluctant to see their (potentially large) limit orders openly revealed in the order book.12
At the start of the trading day and before the regular continuous trading, a pre-opening auction
takes place: limit orders are submitted and a start-of-day auction sets the opening price; all orders
not executed at the end of the opening period remain in the order book.13 Throughout the trading
day, achievable trade prices are bounded by a static and a dynamic price limit. The static bounds
12See D’Hondt, De Winne, and Francois-Heude (2002) for a description of hidden orders on the Euronext trading
platform.
13See also Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1999).
9are set immediately after the opening auction: they are equal to the auction price +- 10%. During
the day, if a trade takes place outside these static bounds, trading is stopped and a new auction
takes place (for a time period of 5 minutes). This auction ﬁnal price deﬁnes new static bounds,
used thereafter. The second type of bounds are dynamic: a trade cannot take place at a price larger
(smaller) than the last trade price plus 2% (minus 2%). If orders can be matched at a transaction
price outside the dynamic bounds, the trade is not executed and trading is stopped. A new auction
takes place and deﬁnes new static and dynamic bounds. A ﬁnal auction occurs between 5.25 and
5.30 p.m., followed by an additional 10-minute period where traders can trade at the price set by the
end-of-day auction.
Note that, depending on the stock, two different Euronext members are involved in the trading
process: brokers (called “N´ egociateurs”) and market makers (called “Animateurs de march´ e”). All
stocks do not feature a market maker. Indeed, stocks belonging to the Euronext 100 index (the ﬁrst
100 Euronext stocks which have the largest market capitalizations) don’t feature any market maker.
Nevertheless, market makers are still allowed to enter orders for these stocks, but then they are
considered as simple brokers.
B. The dataset
We were granted access to two historical datasets (for Brussels-traded stocks over a period ranging
from December 2, 2002 to April 30, 2003) by Euronext. The ﬁrst dataset contains the limit order
book (LOB) as available to market participants who are not formally Euronext members, i.e. the
historical real-time feed of the 5 best orders (price, total volume at that price and number of standing
limit orders at that price) on the bid and ask sides of the order book. Indeed, all order book events
(order entry, cancellation,...) are time-stamped to the second and lead to a potential order book
modiﬁcation, which is recorded in real-time by Euronext. We thus have snapshots of the 5 best
bid and ask limit orders in real-time over the historical period we work with. It should however be
stressed that the hidden portion of the iceberg orders is not included in the dataset. As discussed
below, this will impact some of our conclusions (regarding the available ex-ante liquidity in the
order book for example), while others should not be affected (the ex-post assessment of trading
costs for example). The second dataset contains all transactions, more speciﬁcally the prices and
volumes of the trades time-stamped to the second. Moreover, we also know if the orders matched in
the transaction were so-called client or proprietary orders (the two most frequent cases), or market
10maker orders (a third possibility).14 Note that the LOB dataset sometimes contains errors as the
ordering of prices is not always enforced (e.g. the best ask price is sometimes larger than the ask
price ranked second). These errors amount to less than 2% percent of all LOB observations and
are removed from the dataset. Furthermore, the trades dataset did not give any information on the
side (buy or sell) from which the trade originated. By using the LOB data, we are however able to
determine rigourously the sign of the trade, as trades can only occur at the prices displayed in the
book. Thus we did not have to rely on the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm as used by most authors
who work with NYSE data.
In this study we focus on three large-cap Belgian stocks (Dexia, Electrabel and Interbrew) and
three mid-cap Belgian Stocks (KBC, Solvay and UCB).15 The ﬁrst three stocks are characterized
by a very large trading activity and are well-known blue-chip stocks widely held by individual
and institutional investors. The three mid-cap stocks are also quite actively traded stocks. All six
stocks are members of the BEL20 stock index (which features the most ‘representative’ stocks of
the Belgian economy) and no market maker (“animateurs de march´ e”) is involved in the trading of
any of these stocks. Descriptive characteristics for the six selected stocks are given in Table I. The
stock prices for each stock are plotted in Figure 1.
IV. Empirical analysis
A. The importance of intraday seasonality
Most empirical studies on high-frequency data (Engle and Russell, 1998; Bisi` ere and Kamionka,
2000; Bauwens and Giot, 2001; Bauwens and Giot, 2003) stress the need to correctly model the
intraday seasonality exhibited by this kind of data. Indeed, when modelling the volatility, the traded
volume, or the spread on an intraday basis, it is of paramount importance to proceed along a four-
step procedure: (1) deﬁne regularly time-spaced measures of interest (e.g. working at the 15-minute
frequency, the 15-minute return volatility, the 15-minute traded volume, the average effective spread
over the 15-minute interval,...); (2) compute the time-of-day pattern for each measure; (3) desea-
14A so-called client order is an order routed to a Euronext member for execution by an outside investor. A proprietary
order is executed by a Euronext member for his own trading account.
15This classiﬁcation of large- and mid-cap stocks is relevant for average European investors. US investors (and more
particularly large institutional investors) would consider all these stocks to be only mid-cap stocks, and some of these
even almost small-cap stocks.
11sonalize each measure by its respective time-of-day pattern; (4) model the deseasonalized variable
using an econometric model. Failure to recognize the importance of steps (2) and (3) often lead to
incorrect model estimations (see Andersen and Bollerslev, 1997, for an application to the modelling
of intraday volatility). Moreover there is also an economic justiﬁcation in the modelling of the intra-
day seasonality. Because market participants are actively involved in the day-to-day market action,
they know and expect a given pattern of activity (or volatility, spread,...) and are only affected by
deviations (or surprises) from what was expected. A well-known example is the reaction of eco-
nomic agents to news announcements: by itself, the news (e.g. the CPI number in the US) is not
really relevant; what matters is the difference between the actual number and the expected number
(see e.g. Bauwens, Ben Omrane, and Giot, 2003 or Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega, 2003).
Asaillustration, weplotinFigures2to5thetime-of-daypatternforthe(annualized)volatilityof
the 15-minute returns, the 15-minute average traded volume, the relative quoted spread, the current
and effective spread (on the same ﬁgure), the bid and ask quoted depth, the price impacts for the bid
and ask sides, and the trade aggressiveness. Quoted spreads, effective spreads and the quoted ask
and bid depths are deﬁned as usual, see Harris (2002). Note that, because we deal with an automated
auction market, the effective spread can be larger than the quoted spread, as some transactions walk
up the book and thus transaction prices are larger than the quoted spread. The current spread is the
quoted spread as observed before the transaction takes place (thus a comparison with the quoted
spread allows to assess the extent of traders’ market timing). Price impacts capture the premium
paid by traders when the transaction is executed against standing limit orders beyond the best quotes.

















The same formula is used for the ask side (see Beltran, Giot, and Grammig (2003) for a discussion
of this measure of liquidity). By construction, the larger the transaction (i.e. the larger v), the larger
the price paid as the market order hits more and more limit orders and is likely to walk up further in
the book. We compute the price impacts for a volume v equal to 0.5, 1, 1.5 and 2 times a reference
volume (the corresponding price impacts are labelled price impact level 1 to 4). The reference
12volume corresponds to a transaction for a nominal amount of 30,000 euros divided by the average
price over the sample; this provides an easy comparison across stocks. Price impacts measure
liquidity as offered by the book on an ex-ante basis, i.e before the transaction takes place. Trade
aggressiveness measures how much traders use the book. It is computed as the volume-weighted
average of the trades which are matched by standing limit orders strictly beyond the best quotes.16
When trading volume rises, trade aggressiveness can remain low if the book provides more liquidity
to the market (thus quoted depths rise).
As suggested by Figure 3, trading activity is highly concentrated in the afternoon trading session.
This is consistent with the well-known inﬂuence of the pre-opening and opening of the US stock
marketsonthedynamicsoftheEuropeanmarkets. AtthestartofthetradingsessiononEuronext, the
volatility is particularly high (Figure 2), while the traded volume (Figure 3) or the average volume
per trade (Figure 4) are not that large. On the other hand, traded volume increases at the end of the
day while the increases in volatility appear more subdued. As far as the order book is concerned,
it provides a reasonable amount of liquidity throughout the day. Although quoted spread and price
impacts (see Figures 6, 9) are larger at the opening, they remain small and stable throughout the
trading day, with a slight deterioration near the close of the trading session.17 Depths at the quotes
are up by roughly 50% in the afternoon compared with the morning (see Figure 8). Moreover
and although trading volumes are larger after 2 pm, transaction costs, as measured by the effective
spread (Figure 7), are quite low and constant, except at the start of the trading session where traders
have to pay twice the price they pay during the rest of the day. Indeed, while trade aggressiveness
appears to be large on average at the opening of the trading session and around the opening of the
US markets, the provision of liquidity by limit orders in the book seems to avoid a sharp increase
in transaction costs (except at the opening). These empirical facts are consistent with the previous
ﬁndings reported in the literature (see Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) for the Paris Bourse, Beltran,
Giot, and Grammig (2003) for the Frankfurt XETRA platform, or Hamao and Hasbrouck (1995) for
the Tokyo Stock Exchange). Note that for the whole sample, the average depth offered on the bid
side is higher than on the ask side and, on average, the buy side of the order book seems to be more
aggressive in price than the sell side. Nevertheless, these results may be only relevant for the time
period considered in this study (as we ‘only’ deal with 5 months).
16For example, a buy trade must be matched with at least one standing limit order above the best ask price to be
characterized as being ‘aggressive’.
17Note that the ﬁgures for the ask side of the book are very similar to those presented for the bid side. Hence they are
not given here but are available on request.
13B. The impact of volatility on liquidity measures
The main goal of the paper is to study how market conditions and liquidity are affected by volatility.
As discussed above, what matters for market participants are deviations from expected volatility,
hence the need to focus on the deseasonalized volatility and its impact on (deseasonalized) liq-
uidity measures. While the raw data are ﬁrst pre-sampled at the 15-minute frequency (to deﬁne
the 15-minute returns and to compute the time-of-day patterns as given above for example), we
thereafter focus on 4 sub-intervals which span one trading day: [9h:11h], [11h:13h], [13h:15h] and
[15h:17h30]. The [9h:11h] interval is just after the market open, [11h:13h] ends with the traders’
lunchtime, [13h:15h] ranges from the start of the afternoon trading up to the New York pre-open and
[15h:17h30] should capture the increased activity due to the opening of the US markets and ends
with the close of trading on the Euronext platform. Besides, the switch from 15-minute intervals to
2-hours intervals is consistent with the notion of realized volatility (see below) as a volatility mea-
sure computed from the ‘aggregation’ of really high-frequency squared returns. As such, estimation
results (see the log-log regressions below) from models where the volatility is the independent vari-
able should be less noisy. With respect to these 4 intervals, we thus compute the realized volatility,
aggregated effective spread, aggregated quoted spread, aggregated traded volume, aggregated trade
aggressiveness, aggregated ask and bid depths and different measures of the aggregated ask and bid
price impacts (as deﬁned above). We now proceed with the deﬁnition of these aggregated measures
computed from the data sampled at the 15-minute frequency.
First and following Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) or Giot and Laurent (2004), we deﬁne the
realized volatility as the sum of the intraday squared returns which pertain to the required intervals.
As shown in Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), the realized volatility measure provides a model-free
estimation of return volatility over a given time interval (provided that high-frequency returns are
available). For example, with 15-minute returns and for the [11h-13h] time interval, the realized




where r11h15 is the 15-minute return for the [11h-11h15] time interval and r13h is the 15-minute
return for the [12h45-13h] time interval on December 2, 2002. The aggregated effective spread,
quoted spread, traded volume, trade aggressiveness, ask and bid depths and price impacts are re-
spectively the mean effective spread, mean quoted spread, traded volume, mean trade aggressive-
14ness, mean depths and mean price impacts (computed from the 15-minute intervals) averaged over
the [9h:11h], [11h:13h], [13h:15h] and [15h:17h30] intervals.
In a second step and for each interval, the time-of-day pattern of each measure is computed (see
above for the discussion of seasonality and the computation of the deseasonalized measures). Next
we compute the deseasonalized variables by dividing each measure by its respective time-of-day.
We then estimate the following log-log regressions:
ln(Xi) = b0+b1ln(RVi)+ei; i = 1:::N; (4)
where Xi is successively Si, Qi, Vi, TAi, DBi, DAi, BPIi and APIi (respectively the deseasonalized
aggregated effective spread, quoted spread, traded volume, trade aggressiveness, bid depth, ask
depth, bid price impact and ask price impact), RVi is the deseasonalized realized volatility and N is
the total number of observations. Because we use log-log regressions, b1 can be interpreted as an
elasticity that ‘links’ deseasonalized variables. The interpretation of these elasticities is as follows.
For the ln(Si) = b0+b1ln(RVi)+ei regression for example, a b1 of 0.3 would imply that a 100%
increase in the level of realized volatility (with respect to its expected level based on the time-of-day)
would yield a 30% increase in the effective spread (with respect to its expected level based on the
time-of-day).
Estimation results for the six stocks are given in the top panel of Table II. Note that we also
plot the relationship between the deseasonalized aggregated effective spread and the deseasonalized
realized volatility in Figure 10 and the relationship between the deseasonalized aggregated trade
aggressiveness and the deseasonalized realized volatility in Figure 11. The results indicate that the
elasticity for the effective spread - realized volatility relationship is around 8% for Dexia, and a
bit more than 20% for the other ﬁve stocks. For the trade aggressiveness - realized volatility rela-
tionship, the elasticities are around 15% for the three large-cap stocks, and range between 9% and
23% for the other three stocks. The ﬁgures also show that there is no sharp deterioration in market
liquidity when volatility increases sharply. Indeed a positive relationship between both effective
spread and trade aggressiveness vs realized volatility is at play (which is expected from the market
microstructure literature), but this positive dependence is somewhat muted (see below for additional
discussions). The analysis for the quoted spread and depths yields similar results. Table III shows
that the elasticity for the quoted spread-realized volatility relationship is around 12% for Dexia, and
between 22% and 28% for the other stocks. Furthermore, while there is a negative relationship be-
15tween the depth (for both sides of the order book) and the realized volatility, it is not signiﬁcant. We
also look at the relationship between the deseasonalized aggregated price impact (level 1 to 4) and
the deseasonalized realized volatility (this last analysis thus uses information provided by the full
limit order book dataset). The outputs of the log-log regressions are given in Table IV and Table V.
We can see that, for the elasticity between the bid price impact (for level 2, the reference volume of
30,000 euros) and the realized volatility, this relationship is slightly weaker for Dexia at 10% than
for the other stocks (at more than 14%). Moreover, the numerical values are quite similar for the
four price impact levels. For the sell side, results are roughly the same, as the elasticities remain
below 10% (except for UCB and KBC, around 20%). These results are displayed graphically in
Figures 12 and 13.
B.1. High and low volatility regimes
Up to now we analyzed the whole bunch of observations put together, i.e. we did not deal separately
with high-volatility and low-volatility time periods. Thereafter we split the deseasonalized measures
deﬁned on the [9h:11h], [11h:13h], [13h:15h] and [15h:17h30] intervals into a low-volatility and
high-volatility subset. To construct the two sub-datasets, we apply a two-state Markov switching
model (such as introduced by Hamilton, 1989) to the series of deseasonalized realized volatility.
Using the smoothed transition probabilities, we can then immediately determine which observations
belong to the low-volatility regime and which ones can be put into the high-volatility sub-dataset.
More formally, we assume that the deseasonalized realized volatility RVi switches regime ac-
cording to an unobserved variable si: regime 1 (si = 1) is the low-volatility state, while regime 2
(si = 2) is the high-volatility state. At time i, the volatility state is thus si 2 f1;2g and the dynamics
of si is governed by a Markov process: P(si = 1jsi¡1 = 1) = p11, P(si = 2jsi¡1 = 1) = 1¡ p11,
P(si = 2jsi¡1 = 2) = p22 and P(si = 1jsi¡1 = 2) = 1¡ p22, where p11 (p22) is the probability of be-
ing in the low-volatility (high-volatility) state at time i given that the low-volatility (high-volatility)
state is observed at time i¡1. In state m, the deseasonalized realized volatility is equal to µm, with
variance s2
m. We estimate the parameters of the model using the MSVAR package (maximum likeli-
hood, EM algorithm) of H.-M. Krolzig in the OX 3.2 econometric framework, which also computes
the smoothed transition probabilities. Finally, these are used to separate the observations into the
two sub-datasets. We then re-run the log-log regressions.
16Estimation results for these regressions are given in the middle and bottom panels of Tables II,
III, IV and V. Let us consider ﬁrst the effective spread and trade aggressiveness. A comparison of
the elasticities in both regimes indicates that the numerical values are close to one another for the
effective spread, quite similar although sometimes different for the trade aggressiveness and very
dissimilar for the traded volume. In all cases, the effective spread - realized volatility and trade
aggressiveness - realized volatility elasticities do not signiﬁcantly change when volatility switches
from the low- to the high-volatility state.18 In other words, these relationships (which focus mainly
on the ex-post liquidity or actual cost of trading) do not seem to signiﬁcantly deteriorate in times
of high volatility. These results are corroborated by the estimates for the limit order book dataset
(quoted spread, bid and ask depths, bid and ask price impacts), see the results given in Tables III,
IV and V. As reported, most elasticities are not signiﬁcant and only the quoted spread elasticity is
signiﬁcant during stress periods. This suggests that the Euronext system provides adequate liquidity
in both low- and high-volatility regimes as the slopes of these key relationships do not change
in a meaningful way (a trading system with poor liquidity would be characterized by increasing
elasticities as volatility increases, indicating that liquidity dries up in high volatility regimes).
If high-volatility regimes do not signiﬁcantly impact the elasticities of the effective spread -
realized volatility and trade aggressiveness - realized volatility relationships, they do affect the mean
(or expected value) of the effective spread and trade aggressiveness. These results, computed from
a comparison of the ﬁgures given in the middle and bottom panels of Tables II, III, IV and V, are
reported in Table VI. For UCB (the “worst case” in terms of deterioration of liquidity during the
high-volatility regime), the effective spread goes up by 60% and trades are more aggressive (+9%)
despite the decrease of liquidity in the book. Indeed, price impacts (bid side, level 3) surged by 39%
on average, and quoted depths were 13% lower. This suggests that traders were somehow reluctant
to enter large orders given the low liquidity offered by the book. Note that DEXIA is the most liquid
stock as the effective spread only increases by 10%. Broadly speaking and looking at all reported
results for the six stocks, the decrease in liquidity seems very reasonable when compared with the
increase in average volatility between the low- and high-volatility regimes (nearly 500%). Moreover
and given that the amount (in share volume) of the hidden orders (not featured in our database) on
the Euronext trading platform is estimated at 30% of the total book (see D’Hondt, De Winne, and
Francois-Heude (2002)), the argument according to which there is a sufﬁcient liquidity provision
seems to be valid.
18This was tested using regression analysis and appropriately deﬁned dummy variables.
17B.2. Additional results
For the aggregated effective spread and aggregated trade aggressiveness, we also re-estimate some
of the log-log regressions allowing for a quadratic effect, i.e. we include the squared independent
variable as an additional explicative variable. We thus estimate:
ln(Si) = b0+b1ln(RVi)+b2(ln(RVi))2+ei; (5)
and
ln(TAi) = b0+b1ln(RVi)+b2(ln(RVi))2+ei (6)
where the variables are deﬁned as before. For the 6 stocks and for both liquidity measures, the b2
coefﬁcient is however not signiﬁcant (full numerical results are available on request).
Finally, in a previous version of the paper, we also considered an exogenous volatility crite-
ria: the low-volatility subset featured the measures for which the realized volatility was within one
standard deviation of its expected value (‘average volatility’ group) while the high-volatility sub-
set featured the intervals for which the realized volatility was beyond one standard deviation of its
expected value (‘above-average volatility’ group). The estimation results were quite close to those
shown above for the volatility criteria based on the Markov switching process and are therefore not
included in this version of the paper.
V. Trading dynamics
In this section we analyze how the volatility level affects the interplay between the main liquidity
components (spreads, price impacts, average volume per trade,...) and the relationships between
liquidityandvolatility. Becausethisanalysishingesontheinvestigationofthedynamicsofliquidity,
we use VAR models applied to the original data sampled at the 15-minute frequency. The VAR
analysis will thus ﬁrst be performed on the whole dataset, and then on the subsets deﬁned by the
low- and high-volatility states identiﬁed by the Markov switching model.19
19The use of VAR models to analyze high-frequency equidistantly time spaced data has been advocated by Joel
Hasbrouck, see e.g. Hasbrouck (1999).
18A. VAR models and impulse response functions
We model the dynamics between liquidity and volatility using a Vector Autoregression (VAR)
model. VAR models are to some extent a-theoretical, in the sense that we do not really specify
economic relationships. Hence, we need to impose some restrictions on the estimated coefﬁcients






where Xt is the vector of endogenous variables and et is the usual error term. With respect to the
application considered in this paper, we estimate a 4-lag VAR (the lag dynamics is thus roughly
equal to one hour as we work with 15-minute intervals), with 7 variables (6 of the 7 variables
are endogenous and the last one is exogenous, see below). These variables, which have all been
previously deseasonalized by their respective time-of-day as described in the preceding section, are:
- Liquidity ex-ante: quoted spread and the price impact for a trade of 45,000 euros (average of the
ask and bid sides);
- Liquidity ex-post: effective spread and trade aggressiveness;
- Activity variables: number of trades and average volume per trade;
- Volatility.
Weﬁrsttestforblockexogeneityofeachofthevariablesandascertainthatonlytradeaggressive-
ness is exogenous at the 5% level. Thereafter, we thus estimate a VAR with 6 endogenous variables:
quoted spread, average price impact for a transaction of 45,000 euros, number of trades, average
volume per trade, the effective spread, and volatility; trade aggressiveness is the only exogenous
variable. Using the BIC criteria, we further reduce the dimension of the system as it indicates that
a 2-lag structure is adequate. Finally we estimate the selected VAR(2) model twice: ﬁrst with the
observations belonging to the low-volatility regime, and then with the observations which pertain to
the high-volatility regime. Using a Cholesky decomposition, we further decompose the residuals et







matrix V(et) is diagonal. It also allows the system analysis of the impact of a one-period shock to
a given variable, also called impulse response functions. We compute the 20-lag (5 hours, about
half a trading day) impulse response functions for the VAR model estimated ﬁrst with all the data,
and then with the data provided by the low- and high-volatility regime classiﬁcation. For the ﬁrst
VAR(2) model as for the low- and high-volatility regime VAR(2) models, we tried several endoge-
nous variable ordering to ascertain that the choice of ordering did not lead to different results. The
impulse responses exhibit remarkably similar shapes whatever the ordering. This is important as it
implies that the correlation between the individual shocks ejt (where j denotes the j-th variable) is
small and thus does not appear as important as in many macroeconomic structural models. The main
argument as to why cross-correlations between shocks are large in macroeconomic models is that
the data is typically monthly/quarterly and thus lagged response to a single shock within the month
are aggregated and consequently treated as a contemporaneous impact when dealing with monthly
data. This suggests that the chosen 15-minute interval is small enough to avoid aggregation issues.
Figures 14 to 25 report the impulse response for the 6 variables and for the 6 stocks in both
regimes. We also compute 95% level conﬁdence intervals, but do not report these in the paper. In
both regimes, most of the impulse responses are signiﬁcantly different from zero (ﬂat IR), but there
are no marked differences between the low- and high-volatility regimes (see below for additional
discussion). Moreover, the conﬁdence intervals for the high-volatility regime are larger than for the
low-volatility regime; for many impulse responses, the conﬁdence intervals for the low-volatility
regime lie within the ones for the high-volatility regime.20 In all cases the width of the conﬁdence
intervals strongly decreases after 4 periods on average, i.e. roughly one hour. Furthermore, for
volatility shocks and the impulse responses of a variable to its own shock, impulse responses are
signiﬁcantly different between regimes at the 95% conﬁdence level. To improve on the impulse
response analysis, we compute two additional statistics: half-life times and cumulated impacts. The
cumulated impact of a shock is deﬁned as the sum of the impulse responses over all 20 periods; it
is also the long-run impact of a permanent shock. The half-life is the time needed to achieve half of
the cumulated impact; thus it measures the speed of return to equilibrium.
20The number of observations in the low-volatility regime is roughly twice the number of observations in the high-
volatility regime.
20B. Impulse response functions and the dynamics of liquidity
The impulse responses are reported in Figures 14 to 25. We summarize all results in Tables VII and
VIII, which thus supplement/summarize the description given below.
A look at the impulse responses show that in both regimes, an increase in volatility decreases
ex-ante and ex-post liquidity. Indeed, as the winner’s curse rises with volatility, limit order traders
want to be better rewarded for their provision of liquidity and consequently market orders become
more expensive (see e.g. Foucault (1999)). This explains why, in both regimes, we ﬁnd that liquidity
drops when volatility surges. However we also ﬁnd that, when faced with higher volatility, traders
submit largermarketorders despite higher potential trading costs. Traders also submit more frequent
orders. If volatility is a proxy for the arrival of information, this is consistent with the the presence
of informed traders keen on trading quickly.
For all variables, volatility shocks are signiﬁcantly larger in the high-volatility regime. A one-
standard-deviation volatility shock immediately increases the quoted spread by less than 16% in the
low-volatility regime, and by 16% to 35% (depending on the stock) in the high-volatility regime. A
similarresultholdsinthelongrun. Lookingatthedynamicsofthebookdepth, thecontemporaneous
effect of a volatility shock is positive in both regimes and larger during stress periods. Nevertheless,
the long-term impact is smaller in the high-volatility regime for half of the stocks. Thus, we cannot
conclude that book depth is signiﬁcantly lower in the high-volatility regime. Regarding trading
costs, the long-run impact of a volatilityshock is 6% to 20% higher when volatilityis high than when
volatility is low. Finally, volatility shocks have a long-lasting impact on the liquidity measures. For
example, after one hour, only half of the effect of the shock has been incorporated into liquidity. On
the contrary, activity reacts within the ﬁrst 15 minutes. Note also that the book reacts more rapidly
(within 15 minutes) in the high-volatility regime. This is consistent with larger adverse selection
risks and thus a more active monitoring of limit orders by traders. Overall, the impact of volatility
on liquidity and trading costs is indeed more pronounced during stress periods, but the provision of
liquidity does not really deteriorate either.
The analysis also shows that trading activity attracts the submission of aggressive limit orders
(the spread decreases), whereas large trades deter them (larger spread). Besides, during the ﬁrst hour
after the shock, the surge in average volume attracts limit orders, but not at the best quotes: spreads
rise, but the price impact is smaller. If there are more trades, the spread decreases while the book
becomes thinner, which is the same result as in the long-run. Contrary to volatility shocks, liquidity
21reacts to an increase in activity quite quickly (15 minutes); this is likely due to competition in the
provision of liquidity in non-informative periods.
When the quoted spread rises or the book becomes thinner, trading intensity and the average
size of the trade drops. Interestingly, the impulse response of the average volume per trade to quoted
spread shocks is (although negative) not signiﬁcantly different from zero in both regimes. This may
imply that the spread is not a key variable for the average volume per trade; depth seems more rel-
evant for traders. Furthermore, the analysis highlights the fact that there is some kind of short-term
trade-off in the provision of liquidity: a positive shock on the price impacts (lower depth) decreases
contemporaneous spread, but increases it subsequently. Albeit not statistically signiﬁcant, this ef-
fect is more pronounced when volatility is high.21 In the long run, negative liquidity shocks lead to
subsequent decreases in ex-ante and ex-post liquidity. This “vicious circle” seems to be more pro-
nounced in the high-volatility regime (although the difference may not be statistically signiﬁcant).
For some stocks, the drop in liquidity (ex-ante and ex-post) is ﬁve times larger in the high-volatility
regime. This shows that, in periods of turmoil, even without new information, liquidity can shrink
when many traders withdraw from the exchange (liquidity shock). It is also worth stressing that a
spread positive shock has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on volatility.
Finally, for all stocks, the impulse responses of a variable to its own shock are always signiﬁ-
cantly lower in the low-volatility regime. Although shocks last for roughly the same time in both
regimes, the impact on market conditions is thus much larger during turmoil. For instance, a neg-
ative shock to ex-ante liquidity when markets are volatile leads to a long-term decrease (in ex-ante
liquidity) 20% to 80% larger than in normal periods. The good news (for the Euronext platform and
for central banks) is however that, although shocks have larger impacts on average in high-volatility
regimes, they are still absorbed quite rapidly as they last for about the same time in both regimes.
VI. Conclusion
Using limit order book and transaction data for three large-cap and three mid-cap Belgian stocks
traded on the Euronext system, we study the relationships between different liquidity measures and
market volatility. We consider ex-ante (e.g. quoted spread, bid and price price impacts, depths)
21We checked that this effect was not due to a particular ordering of the variables. Indeed, if we reorder the variables
such that the spread causes the price impact (in the model presented, it is the opposite), we found exactly the same
effect: a negative shock on the spread (smaller spread) increases contemporaneously price impacts (thinner book), but
decreases it subsequently (the book ﬁlls up).
22and ex-post (e.g. effective spread, trade aggressiveness) liquidity measures which are fully available
once complete order book data is at hand. From an econometric point of view, we work with the
realized volatility as popularized recently in Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), which allows us to de-
ﬁne a low- and high-volatility regime based on Markov switching techniques, and with VAR models
(` a la Hasbrouck) that allow insight into the dynamical analysis of liquidity components. Thereafter,
we thus assess the different relationships (mostly modelled as log-log regressions on appropriately
deﬁned liquidity measures) with all the data, and then separately in the low- and high-volatility
regimes. This analysis thus sheds light on the behaviour of automated auction markets in times of
low and high volatility, and allows us to quantify the impact of the switch in volatility regimes on
key ex-ante and ex-post liquidity measures relevant for traders and/or institutional investors. In the
last part of the paper, we model the trading dynamics using a VAR system (and impulse response
analysis) applied to some market variables.
Our results indicate that the provision of liquidity in the Euronext trading system seems to be
quite resilient to increases in volatility. Indeed, the slopes of these liquidity measures - volatility
relationships (e.g. effective spread - volatility or trade aggressiveness - volatility relationships for
example) do not signiﬁcantly change when volatility switches from the low-volatility to the high-
volatility regime. In contrast, the mean (or expected value) of each liquidity measure is usually
signiﬁcantly higher in the high-volatility state, but this was expected from the market microstructure
literature. The dynamical analysis based on the VAR model presented in the second part of the
paper does not allow us to be conclusive in either way (i.e. whether volatility seriously impacts
liquidity, or that there is no impact). On the contrary, it offers a more balanced view according to
which the volatility regime bears moderately on the dynamics of the liquidity provision. As such, the
main empirical result of this study is that there is no real important deterioration in the provision of
liquidity when volatility increases, although we do ﬁnd that it is more costly to trade when volatility
is high and that the market dynamics is somewhat affected.
As indicated by many theoretical studies, adverse selection increases when volatility increases,
which results in a more costly provision of limit orders. As a consequence, market liquidity drops
when volatility increases. In periods of ﬁnancial distress, this is the one of the main concerns of
central banks since this behavior may lead to the collapse or near-collapse of ﬁnancial markets (e.g.
the 1987 krach and the LTCM failure in 1998, among others). As recently suggested by Mishkin
and White (2002), a ﬁnancial crisis combined with a large drop in liquidity may be particularly
destabilizing, and thus potentially requires prompt and adequate action by monetary authorities.
23The concern about a systemic drop in ﬁnancial liquidity, shared by many studies (see e.g. Borio
and Lowe (2002) and Borio (2003)), leads many academics and practitioners to suggest that central
banks should perhaps play a regulatory role in ﬁnancial markets. However and given the many ways
stock markets can be set up (pure order book market, price-driven market, hybrid market), the ﬁrst
natural step is to understand the dynamics of liquidity in stress periods in each type of market. While
this kind of study had already been done for some price-driven markets or for some hybrid markets,
no empirical study had yet focused on that topic for Euronext. Regarding the behavior of liquidity in
high-volatility regimes, the results presented in this paper are particularly promising. Indeed, even
if trading costs are larger in stress periods, the trading system does not seem to break down.
Our results of course pave the way for additional research linked to that topic. An obvious
extension would be to assess our relationships on an extended dataset which would feature a much
larger number of stocks sub-divided into smaller groups based on the ﬁrms’ characteristics. In
this extended setting, we could thus quantify the possible deterioration in the provision of liquidity
according to the most salient characteristics of the stock (e.g. small-cap, mid-cap, large-cap; type
of industry;...). It could also be argued that the Markov switching algorithm should be applied to
the overall market volatility (for example the volatility of the index). This would lead to the same
classiﬁcation of low- and high-volatility regimes for all stocks. In the same vein, the classiﬁcation
into low- and high-regimes could also be done with respect to the trading activity for example
(instead of volatility). This would yield insights into the provision of liquidity in different trading
environments.
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Descriptive statistics and elasticities (I).
All observations
N Effective spread Traded volume Trade aggressiveness
Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean
DEXIA 409 0.081 (0) 0.152 (0) 0.148 (0)
ELECTRABEL 409 0.248 (0) 0.159 (0) 0.167 (0)
INTERBREW 409 0.215 (0) 0.131 (0) 0.130 (0)
KBC 409 0.241 (0) 0.045 (0.16) 0.109 (0)
SOLVAY 409 0.235 (0) 0.117 (0) 0.227 (0)
UCB 409 0.255 (0) 0.055 (0.08) 0.089 (0)
Low-volatility regime
N Effective spread Traded volume Trade aggressiveness
Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean
DEXIA 335 0.092 (0) 0.982 0.110 (0) 0.949 0.183 (0) 0.980
ELECTRABEL 358 0.246 (0) 0.933 0.111 (0) 0.926 0.174 (0) 0.973
INTERBREW 245 0.202 (0) 0.856 0.081 (0.09) 0.879 0.140 (0.03) 0.919
KBC 293 0.237 (0) 0.898 0.025 (0.59) 0.986 0.151 (0) 0.973
SOLVAY 267 0.224 (0) 0.844 0.161 (0) 0.961 0.206 (0) 0.902
UCB 324 0.270 (0) 0.889 0.043 (0.27) 0.957 0.116 (0.01) 0.981
High-volatility regime
N Effective spread Traded volume Trade aggressiveness
Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean
DEXIA 74 0.073 (0.14) 1.083 (0) 0.418 (0) 1.230 (0) 0.251 (0.01) 1.089 (0.07)
ELECTRABEL 51 0.307 (0) 1.469 (0) 0.491 (0.01) 1.516 (0) 0.295 (0.29) 1.189 (0.01)
INTERBREW 164 0.198 (0) 1.215 (0) 0.229 (0.09) 1.181 (0) -0.015 (0.85) 1.121 (0)
KBC 116 0.274 (0) 1.259 (0) 0.382 (0.01) 1.035 (0.51) 0.121 (0.41) 1.068 (0.06)
SOLVAY 142 0.239 (0) 1.294 (0) 0.124 (0.22) 1.074 (0.09) 0.186 (0.04) 1.184 (0)
UCB 85 0.208 (0.01) 1.422 (0) 0.293 (0.10) 1.162 (0.05) 0.146 (0.27) 1.072 (0.12)
Descriptive statistics and outputs of the log-log regressions where the dependent variable is successively the ag-
gregated effective spread, the aggregated traded volume and the aggregated trade aggressiveness, the independent
variable is the realized volatility in all cases. All measures are computed over the [9h:11h], [11h:13h], [13h:15h]
and [15h:17h30] intervals and are deseasonalized (by their respective time-of-day) prior to running the regres-
sions. The panel ‘Low-volatility regime’ gives the outputs for the sub-datasets where the realized volatility is in
the low-volatility regime; the panel ‘High-volatility regime’ gives the outputs for the sub-datasets where the real-
ized volatility is in the high-volatility regime. ‘Mean’ is the mean of the dependent variable and ‘elasticity’ is the
regression coefﬁcient. For the ‘elasticity’ column, heteroscedastic-consistent P-values for the null hypothesis that
the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant are provided in parenthesis; for the ‘mean’ column, we provide the P-value for the
equality test across both panels. The time period is December 2, 2002 to April 30, 2003.
30Table III
Descriptive statistics and elasticities (II).
All observations
N Quoted spread Bid depth (euros) Ask depth (euros)
Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean
DEXIA 409 0.118 (0) -0.065 (0.03) -0.063 (0.03)
ELECTRABEL 409 0.266 (0) -0.009 (0.81) -0.025 (0.51)
INTERBREW 409 0.218 (0) -0.002 (1) -0.014 (0.64)
KBC 409 0.246 (0) 0.018 (0.62) 0.004 (0.91)
SOLVAY 409 0.229 (0) 0.009(0.79) 0.007 (0.84)
UCB 409 0.287 (0) -0.024 (0.48) -0.043 (0.20)
Low-volatility regime
N Quoted spread Bid depth (euros) Ask depth (euros)
Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean
DEXIA 335 0.130 (0) 0.970 -0.090 (0.04) 1.022 -0.084 (0.05) 1.021
ELECTRABEL 358 0.262 (0) 0.926 -0.016 (0.66) 0.984 -0.031 (0.40) 0.988
INTERBREW 245 0.207 (0) 0.857 0 (1) 0.992 -0.013 (0.80) 0.997
KBC 293 0.253 (0) 0.898 -0.084 (0.13) 0.977 -0.089 (0.11) 0.985
SOLVAY 267 0.218 (0) 0.845 0.020 (0.71) 1.005 0.008 (0.88) 1.015
UCB 324 0.295 (0) 0.869 -0.003 (0.95) 1.028 -0.016 (0.74) 1.039
High-volatility regime
N Quoted spread Bid depth (euros) Ask depth (euros)
Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean
DEXIA 74 0.170 (0) 1.135 0.108 (0.42) 0.898 0.077 (0.56) 0.906
ELECTRABEL 51 0.353 (0) 1.525 -0.250 (0.47) 1.115 -0.254 (0.46) 1.082
INTERBREW 164 0.200 (0) 1.213 0.077 (0.55) 1.012 0.031 (0.81) 1.004
KBC 116 0.194 (0.02) 1.258 0.265 (0.10) 1.058 0.225 (0.16) 1.038
SOLVAY 142 0.189 (0.01) 1.291 -0.126 (0.31) 0.990 -0.154 (0.20) 0.972
UCB 85 0.189 (0.02) 1.498 -0.137 (0.41) 0.893 -0.149 (0.39) 0.852
Descriptive statistics and outputs of the log-log regressions where the dependent variable is successively
the aggregated quoted spread, the aggregated bid depth (in euros) and the aggregated ask depth (in
euros), the independent variable is the realized volatility in all cases (and a constant). All measures
are computed over the [9h:11h], [11h:13h], [13h:15h] and [15h:17h30] intervals and are deseasonalized
(by their respective time-of-day) prior to running the regressions. The panel ‘Low-volatility regime’
gives the outputs for the sub-datasets where the realized volatility is in the low-volatility regime; the
panel ‘High-volatility regime’ gives the outputs for the sub-datasets where the realized volatility is in
the high-volatility regime. ‘Mean’ is the mean of the dependent variable and ‘elasticity’ is the regression
coefﬁcient. For the ‘elasticity’ column, heteroscedastic-consistent P-values for the null hypothesis that
the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant are provided in parenthesis; for the ‘mean’ column, we provide the P-value
for the equality test across both panels. The time period is December 2, 2002 to April 30, 2003.
31Table IV
Descriptive statistics and elasticities (III).
All observations
N Bid PI1 Bid PI2 Bid PI3 Bid PI4
Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean
DEXIA 404 0.059 (0.43) 0.100 (0) 0.096 (0) 0.096 (0)
ELECTRABEL 363 0.170 (0) 0.186 (0) 0.181 (0) 0.203 (0)
INTERBREW 398 0.134 (0) 0.146 (0) 0.136 (0) 0.132 (0.03)
KBC 405 0.126 (0.01) 0.141 (0) 0.154 (0) 0.153 (0)
SOLVAY 391 0.231 (0) 0.239 (0) 0.231 (0) 0.228 (0)
UCB 408 0.146 (0) 0.142 (0) 0.148 (0) 0.152 (0)
Low-volatility regime
N Bid PI1 Bid PI2 Bid PI3 Bid PI4
Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean
DEXIA 332 0.115 (0.18) 0.993 0.166 (0) 0.990 0.149 (0) 0.985 0.135 (0) 0.981
ELECTRABEL 314 0.166 (0.03) 0.952 0.167 (0.01) 0.943 0.193 (0) 0.939 0.218 (0) 0.941
INTERBREW 238 0.116 (0.17) 0.917 0.154 (0.04) 0.905 0.139 (0.03) 0.908 0.136 (0.03) 0.915
KBC 289 0.100 (0.22) 0.923 0.135 (0.01) 0.931 0.139 (0) 0.930 0.130 (0) 0.929
SOLVAY 252 0.247 (0.02) 0.895 0.220 (0) 0.882 0.221 (0) 0.880 0.204 (0) 0.881
UCB 323 0.143 (0.02) 0.913 0.118 (0.01) 0.921 0.126 (0) 0.926 0.132 (0) 0.929
High-volatility regime
N Bid PI1 Bid PI2 Bid PI3 Bid PI4
Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean
DEXIA 72 -0.778(0.29) 1.030 -0.077 (0.70) 1.046 -0.086 (0.65) 1.070 0.066 (0.69) 1.087
ELECTRABEL 49 0.478 (0.14) 1.336 -0.139 (0.76) 1.398 -0.580 (0.23) 1.430 -0.365 (0.28) 1.416
INTERBREW 160 0.113 (0.46) 1.123 0.084 (0.55) 1.141 0.050 (0.67) 1.137 0.052 (0.61) 1.127
KBC 116 0.183 (0.38) 1.195 0.216 (0.15) 1.175 0.218 (0.11) 1.178 0.176 (0.15) 1.178
SOLVAY 139 0.092 (0.60) 1.197 0.262 (0.05) 1.221 0.247 (0.03) 1.226 0.246 (0.02) 1.224
UCB 85 0.257 (0.25) 1.330 0.246 (0.14) 1.302 0.189 (0.14) 1.283 0.180 (0.10) 1.272
Descriptive statistics and outputs of the log-log regressions where the dependent variable is successively the bid price
impacts from level 1 to 4, the independent variable is the realized volatility in all cases (and a constant). All measures
are computed over the [9h:11h], [11h:13h], [13h:15h] and [15h:17h30] intervals and are deseasonalized (by their
respective time-of-day) prior to running the regressions. The panel ‘Low-volatility regime’ gives the outputs for the
sub-datasets where the realized volatility is in the low-volatility regime; the panel ‘High-volatility regime’ gives the
outputs for the sub-datasets where the realized volatility is in the high-volatility regime. ‘Mean’ is the mean of the
dependent variable and ‘elasticity’ is the regression coefﬁcient. For the ‘elasticity’ column, heteroscedastic-consistent
P-values for the null hypothesis that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant are provided in parenthesis; for the ‘mean’ column,
we provide the P-value for the equality test across both panels. The time period is December 2, 2002 to April 30,
2003.
32Table V
Descriptive statistics and elasticities (IV).
All observations
N Ask PI1 Ask PI2 Ask PI3 Ask PI4
Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean
DEXIA 403 0.094 (0.03) 0.089 (0.01) 0.087 (0) 0.088 (0)
ELECTRABEL 350 0.098 (0.13) 0.083 (0.08) 0.110 (0.01) 0.091 (0.03)
INTERBREW 397 0.107 (0.03) 0.098 (0.01) 0.090 (0.01) 0.083 (0.01)
KBC 407 0.218 (0) 0.213 (0) 0.211 (0) 0.211 (0)
SOLVAY 397 0.048 (0.36) 0.092 (0.03) 0.116 (0) 0.125 (0)
UCB 407 0.188 (0) 0.193 (0) 0.191 (0) 0.176 (0)
Low-volatility regime
N Ask PI1 Ask PI2 Ask PI3 Ask PI4
Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean
DEXIA 329 0.083 (0.16) 0.976 0.085 (0.06) 0.975 0.092 (0.02) 0.974 0.096 (0.01) 0.975
ELECTRABEL 303 0.062 (0.42) 0.903 0.036 (0.53) 0.917 0.056 (0.27) 0.923 0.054 (0.25) 0.928
INTERBREW 239 0.081 (0.29) 0.910 0.062 (0.38) 0.918 0.040 (0.51) 0.918 0.048 (0.38) 0.923
KBC 293 0.236 (0) 0.914 0.231 (0) 0.912 0.217 (0) 0.916 0.217 (0) 0.917
SOLVAY 259 -0.046 (0.59) 0.941 -0.008 (0.91) 0.916 0.032 (0.57) 0.907 0.053 (0.31) 0.904
UCB 322 0.148 (0.01) 0.905 0.191 (0) 0.917 0.185 (0) 0.924 0.172 (0) 0.934
High-volatility regime
N Ask PI1 Ask PI2 Ask PI3 Ask PI4
Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean Elasticity Mean
DEXIA 74 0.251 (0.17) 1.107 0.122 (0.37) 1.113 0.107 (0.34) 1.118 0.101 (0.29) 1.114
ELECTRABEL 47 -0.110 (0.84) 1.683 -0.119 (0.70) 1.582 -0.079 (0.74) 1.543 -0.052 (0.81) 1.502
INTERBREW 158 -0.084 (0.69) 1.134 0.054 (0.70) 1.122 0.068 (0.58) 1.122 0.034 (0.74) 1.115
KBC 114 0.082 (0.79) 1.218 0.140 (0.47) 1.222 0.078 (0.61) 1.211 0.080 (0.54) 1.210
SOLVAY 138 0.397 (0.02) 1.111 0.397 (0) 1.159 0.311 (0) 1.175 0.260 (0) 1.180
UCB 85 -0.114 (0.55) 1.361 -0.082 (0.60) 1.317 0.044 (0.72) 1.289 0.086 (0.44) 1.251
Descriptive statistics and outputs of the log-log regressions where the dependent variable is successively the ask price
impacts from level 1 to 4, the independent variable is the realized volatility in all cases (and a constant). All measures are
computed over the [9h:11h], [11h:13h], [13h:15h] and [15h:17h30] intervals and are deseasonalized (by their respective
time-of-day) prior to running the regressions. The panel ‘Low-volatility regime’ gives the outputs for the sub-datasets
where the realized volatility is in the low-volatility regime; the panel ‘High-volatility regime’ gives the outputs for the
sub-datasets where the realized volatility is in the high-volatility regime. ‘Mean’ is the mean of the dependent variable
and ‘elasticity’ is the regression coefﬁcient. For the ‘elasticity’ column, heteroscedastic-consistent P-values for the null
hypothesis that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant are provided in parenthesis; for the ‘mean’ column, we provide the P-value
for the equality test across both panels. The time period is December 2, 2002 to April 30, 2003.
33Table VI






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The dynamics of liquidity.
shock volatility av. volu nb tr pi3 qsp sp
L H L H L H L H L H L H
volatility + + + +
av. volu + + + + - -
nb tr + + + + - - -
pi3 + + - + + +
qsp + + + - - -+ -+ + + + +
sp + + + + - - + + + +
This table presents a summary of the VAR results (analysis of the dy-
namics of liquidity). A “+” (“-”) means that the shock on the given
variable (in the top row) has a positive (negative) and signiﬁcant impact
on the variable (in the ﬁrst column). In a few cases, we report a “-+”,
which indicates that the shock is ﬁrst negative and then positive. “H”
refers to the high-volatility state, while “L” refers to the low-volatility
state. Note that av. volu relates to the average volume per trade, nb
tr, the number of trades, pi3, the level 3 price impact, qsp, the quoted
spread, sp, the effective spread.
Table VIII
Half-life of the impulse responses.
shock volatility av. volu nb tr pi3 qsp sp
volatility 15 30 (15 mn)
av. volu 15 1H 15
nb tr 15 15 15 15
pi3 1H (15 mn) 15 30 (15 mn) 1H30
qsp 1H 15 15 1H 15 30
sp 1H 15 15 45 15
This table reports the half-life of the impulse responses. All results
are expressed in minutes except when there is an “H” (for hour). We
only report results for the signiﬁcant impulse responses. All results are
for the low- and high-volatility states, except when there is a number
in parenthesis (high-volatility state). Note that av. volu relates to the
average volume per trade, nb tr, the number of trades, pi3, the level 3
price impact, qsp, the quoted spread, sp, the effective spread.
35Figure 1. Stock prices. This ﬁgure shows the pattern of the stock prices (sampled at 15-minute
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.Figure 2. Time-of-day for the volatility. This ﬁgure shows the time-of-day pattern for the 15-
minute return volatility (smoothed using the Nadaraya-Watson estimator). The time period is De-
cember 2, 2002 to April 30, 2003.
 
   
 
 
                                                                             
                                                                            37Figure 3. Time-of-day for the traded volume. This ﬁgure shows the time-of-day pattern for the
15-minute traded volume (smoothed using the Nadaraya-Watson estimator). The time period is




   
 
                                                                          38Figure 4. Time-of-day for the average volume per trade. This ﬁgure shows the time-of-day
pattern for the average volume per trade (smoothed using the Nadaraya-Watson estimator). The
time period is December 2, 2002 to April 30, 2003.
 




                                                                          39Figure 5. Time-of-day for the trade aggressiveness. This ﬁgure shows the time-of-day pattern
for the trade aggressiveness (smoothed using the Nadaraya-Watson estimator). The time period is
December 2, 2002 to April 30, 2003. 
 




                                                                             40Figure 6. Time-of-day for the relative inside spread. This ﬁgure shows the time-of-day pattern
for the relative inside spread (smoothed using the Nadaraya-Watson estimator). The time period is
December 2, 2002 to April 30, 2003.
41Figure 7. Time-of-day for the current and effective spread. This ﬁgure shows the time-of-day
pattern for the current and effective spread (smoothed using the Nadaraya-Watson estimator). The






                                                                             42Figure 8. Time-of-day for the inside bid depth (in euros). This ﬁgure shows the time-of-day
pattern for the inside bid depth (in euros) (smoothed using the Nadaraya-Watson estimator). The











                                                                                  43Figure 9. Time-of-day for the bid price impacts. This ﬁgure shows the time-of-day pattern for the
bid price impacts (smoothed using the Nadaraya-Watson estimator). Price impacts are computed
for volumes of 0.5, 1, 1.5 and 2 times the reference volume, which is computed as the volume
corresponding to a transaction of 30,000 euros at the average price for the stock over the sample.
The time period is December 2, 2002 to April 30, 2003.
 






                                                                              44Figure 10. Aggregated effective spread vs realized volatility. Relationship between the aggre-
gated effective spread and the realized volatility. The aggregated effective spread is the average
effective spread over the [9h:11h], [11h:13h], [13h:15h] and [15h:17h30] intervals; the realized
volatility is deﬁned over the same intervals. Both measures are deseasonalized by their respective
time-of-day. The time period is December 2, 2002 to April 30, 2003.  





                                                                          45Figure 11. Aggregated trade aggressiveness vs realized volatility. Relationship between the
aggregated trade aggressiveness and the realized volatility. The aggregated trade aggressiveness is
the average trade aggressiveness over the [9h:11h], [11h:13h], [13h:15h] and [15h:17h30] intervals;
the realized volatility is deﬁned over the same intervals. Both measures are deseasonalized by their
respective time-of-day. The time period is December 2, 2002 to April 30, 2003. 





                                                                          46Figure 12. Aggregated bid inside depth (in euros) vs realized volatility. Relationship between
the aggregated bid inside depth (in euros) and the realized volatility. The aggregated bid inside
depth (in euros) is the average bid inside depth (in euros) over the [9h:11h], [11h:13h], [13h:15h]
and [15h:17h30] intervals; the realized volatility is deﬁned over the same intervals. Both measures
are deseasonalized by their respective time-of-day. The time period is December 2, 2002 to April
30, 2003.
47Figure 13. Aggregated bid price impact (level 3) vs realized volatility. Relationship between
the aggregated bid price impact (level 3) and the realized volatility. The aggregated bid price im-
pact (level 3) is the average bid price impact (level 3) over the [9h:11h], [11h:13h], [13h:15h] and
[15h:17h30] intervals; the realized volatility is deﬁned over the same intervals. Both measures are
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